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Methods	for	studying	cultural	attraction	
Christophe	Heintz,	Stefaan	Blancke,	and	Thom	Scott-Phillips	
Abstract		
Cultural	attraction	theory	(CAT)	describes	a	general	evolutionary	process,	cultural	
attraction,	by	which	the	spread	and	stability	of	cultural	items	(beliefs,	practices,	artifacts,	
etc.)	result	not	just	from	differential	reproduction,	but	also	from	transformations	that	
systematically	favor	the	reconstruction	of	cultural	items	of	specific	types.	In	this	way,	CAT	
aims	to	provide	a	general	framework	for	the	study	of	cultural	evolution.	In	a	thoughtful	
critical	analysis,	Buskell	questions	the	ability	of	CAT	to	provide	methodological	guidance	for	
research	in	cultural	evolution.	Can	CAT	be	used	to	develop	the	sort	of	mid-range	theories	
and	models	that	often	drive	empirical	work?	Here	we	argue	that	CAT	can	indeed	be	used	in	
this	way,	and	we	outline	the	methodologi-	cal	practices	that	students	of	cultural	attraction	
have	used	and	are	currently	developing.		
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1.	Introduction	
Cultural	attraction	theory	(CAT)	is	a	theoretical	framework	that	aims,	ambitiously,	at	the	
development	of	causal	explanations	of	cultural	phenomena.	In	our	recent	article,	“Four	
misunderstandings	about	cultural	attraction”	(hereafter	“Misunderstandings”)	we	
addressed	misreadings	of	this	project—and	we	also	summarized	some	recent	empirical	
applications	of	it.1	We	characterized	CAT	as	“a	research	agenda	the	purpose	of	which	is	to	
develop	causal	explanations	of	cultural	phenomena.”	Note	the	word	“agenda”:	CAT	does	not	
make	specific	predictions	about	specific	cases,	but	instead	aims	to	provide	a	framework	
that	connects	explanation	in	anthropology	with	findings	and	explanation	in	the	natural	
sciences;	and	within	which	individual	researchers	can	develop	models	and	predictions	for	
specific	empirical	cases	of	cultural	phenomena.	Theories	always	need	to	be	supplemented	
by	auxiliary	hypotheses	to	issue	predictions,	and	CAT	needs	to	be	richly	supplemented:	not	
just	with	descriptions	of	local	and	historical	facts,	but	also	with	theories	from	the	other	
sciences—especially	cognitive	psychology.	This	makes	a	CAT	a	framework,	within	which	
hypotheses	about	cognition	can	be	combined	with	social,	cultural,	and	historical	hypotheses	
to	give	testable	explanations.	CAT	specifies	the	explanandum	(attractors)	and	what	form	
the	explanans	can	have	(causal	factors	of	attraction)—but	is	open-minded	about	which	
specific	methods	should	be	used	in	particular	cases.	It	points	out	the	diversity	of	possible	
causes	that	might	shape	a	cultural	phenomenon	and	even	he	causal	promiscuity	in	
culture—and	in	consequence	it	defaults	toward	a	common	sense	attitude	for	studying	
culture	empirically:	if	the	method	is	fruitful	for	gathering	data	or	for	explaining	phenomena,	
then	go	for	it.		
Andrew	Buskell,	in	his	reply	to	Misunderstandings—and	also	Kim	Sterelny	in	his	review	of	
Sperber's	1996	book	“Explaining	Culture”—	asks	if	this	methodological	flexibility	
undermines	the	project.2,3	Specifically,	Buskell	wonders	if	CAT	provides	working	social	
scientists	with	too	little	methodological	guidance	to	study	specific	cultural	phenomena	
empirically.	Does	CAT	provide	any	useful	tools	for	the	study	of	culture?	These	questions	set	
a	useful	challenge.	Several	papers	about	cultural	attraction,	including	ours,	make	general	
theoretical	claims	about	the	nature	of	cultural	phenomena,	but	they	seem	not	to	identify	
specific	research	practices	that	would	enable	social	scientists	to	fructify	the	theory	in	case	
studies.		
Our	response	to	Buskell's	challenge	is	twofold.	The	first	reply	is	that	the	proof	is	in	the	
pudding.	In	the	Introduction	to	Misunderstandings1	we	referenced	many	recent	studies	
that	have	made	use	of	CAT,	and	we	discussed	these	and	other	examples	throughout	the	
article.	In	doing	so	we	effectively	provided	an	up-to-date	summary	of	this	empirical	
literature,	which	includes	topics	as	diverse	as	folk	biology,	supernatural	concepts,	
portraiture,	chimeras,	pseudoscientific	and	scientific	beliefs,	writing	systems,	folk	medicine,	
kinship,	and	numerous	others	too.	In	short,	CAT	is	earning	its	keep	as	a	theoretical	
framework	simply	by	being	useful.	One	of	our	motivations	in	writing	Misunderstandings	
was	to	motivate	scientists	to	do	further	such	studies—not	because	there	exists	a	unique	
good	method	of	investigation,	but	because	CAT	provides	sound	and	strong	theoretical	
foundations	on	which	to	build.		
The	second	answer	to	Buskell's	challenge	would	be	to	make	more	explicit	the	
methodological	guidance	that	this	theoretical	foundation	provides.	After	all,	there	is	such	
guidance,	and	it	is	not	trivial—but	Buskell	is	right	that	it	has	not	been	spelled	out	in	much	
detail	to	date.	We	here	outline	that	advice.		
2.	Methodological	advice	
Having	said	that,	any	such	guidance	should	not	be	read	as	a	list	of	specific	dos	and	don'ts,	
because,	in	fact,	the	first	piece	of	methodological	advice	is:		
Use	the	methods	that	are	best	suited	to	the	specifics	of	the	cultural	phenomenon	studied.		
This	stems	from	the	recognition	that	factors	of	attraction	are,	as	Buskell	acknowledges,	
extremely	diverse:	they	can	be	found	in	the	properties	of	human	cognition	as	well	as	in	local	
beliefs,	in	general	physical	properties	of	the	earth	(e.g.,	gravity,	existence	of	wind)	as	well	as	
in	local	ecological	aspects	(e.g.,	what	materials	for	construction	are	avail-	able)	(Section	3	of	
Misunderstandings).	Identifying	the	causal	role	of	specific	factors	is	bound	to	request	
different	methods.	To	do	this,	CAT	shamelessly	borrows	methods	developed	by	others	as	
well	as	methods	more	specific	to	the	study	of	attraction.	Examples:		
• Applying	statistical	methods	to	long-term	cultural	phenomena,	including	phylogenies.4			
• Developing	modeling	tools.5			
• Doing	cultural	chains	experiments	with	humans.6			
• Doing	cultural	chains	experiments	with	non-human	animals.7			
• Doing	comparative	social	anthropology,	searching	for	recurrent		patterns.8			
Still,	CAT	has	come,	in	its	brief	history,	with	other	general	yet	consequential	methodological	
points,	such	as:			
Cultural	phenomena	can	be	explained	causally.			
This	might	be	a	truism	for	some,	especially	those	who	study	the	evolu-	tion	of	culture,	but	it	
is	not	in	most	of	the	social	sciences.	Especially	in	mainstream	cultural	anthropology	the	
researcher	is	expected	to	inter-	pret,	not	to	causally	explain.	The	methodological	point	is	
anchored	in	a	particular	description	of	culture	as	resulting	from	cultural	chains,	which	are	
chains	of	causally	related	events.	As	a	social	anthropologist,	Sperber	has	dedicated	several	
papers	to	this	important	issue,	explain-	ing	how	interpretation	and	other	ethnographic	
methods,	in	fact,	relate	to	the	scientific	project	of	producing	causal	explanations.9,10	
Zooming	in	on	the	detail	of	cultural	chains,	one	can	track	representations	and	describe	how	
they	are	transmitted	and	processed	in	different	milieu,	whether	in	the	brains	or	in	the	
environment	(Hutchins,	while	not	directly	associated	with	CAT,	provides	seminal	examples	
of	this	type		of	cognitive	ethnography11).	One	can	also	combine	psychological	experiments	
to	participant	observation	to	better	understand	the	psy-	chological	basis	of	cultural	
diversity.12		
More	controversially	for	students	of	cultural	evolution,	CAT	recommends:		
Do	not	systematically	black	box	the	mechanisms	involved	in	cultural	transmission.		
Unlike	the	previous	methodological	point,	this	recommendation	is	one	that	many	students	
of	cultural	evolution	seem	disinclined	to	follow.13	Yet:	it	is	inside	the	black	box	that	the	
causes	of	stability	and	change	are	to	be	found.	Empirical	studies	of	communication	and	
other	means	of	cultural	propagation	show	that	cultural	transmission	is	most	often	biased	
and	is	rarely	replicative.	This	means	that	the	method	of	black-	boxing	transmission,	which	
has	proved	so	fruitful	in	the	biological	case,	cannot	be	fruitfully	used	for	studying	cultural	
evolution,	because	the	black	box	itself	contains	important	causes	of	change	at	the	
population	level.	Cultural	stability	can	be	achieved	if	the	transformations	that	occur	in	
transmission	are	not	random	but	instead	tend	to	be	in	some	direc-	tions	rather	than	others	
(see	Section	5.3	of	Misunderstandings).		
When	opening	the	black	box,	you	also	need	to	make	sure	of	the	following:		
Make	your	theories	compatible	with	current	sciences,	in	particular	(but	not	only),	with	
psychology.		
Buskell	concisely	summarizes	this	point	as	making	“psychological	bets.”	He	observes,	for	
instance,	that	one	such	bet	taken	by	many	of	the	studies	inspired	by	CAT	is	the	theory	that	
the	mind	processes	information	on	the	basis	of	domain	specific	capacities	(called	
modules).14	He	is	thus	moving	the	debate	to	the	right	place:	are	the	psychological	
assumptions	sound	enough	and	warranted	by	evidence,	such	that	they	can	be	put	to	use	in	a	
framework	theory	for	culture?	CAT	itself	is	not	committed	to	this	or	any	other	specific	
psychological	claim,	but	it	provides	a	framework	within	which	to	make	them	explicit	and	
the	object	of	scientific	scrutiny.		
Here	are	some	further	examples	of	such	assumptions,	and	how	they	have	been	used	to	
(help)	explain	specific	cultural	phenomena:		
•	Dispositions	to	favor	genetically	related	individual	helps	to	explain	the	recurrence,	across	
cultures,	of	types	of	relations	between	the	mother's	brother	and	his	sister's	son.8		
•	Attentional	bias	toward	faces	with	direct	gaze	(rather	than	averted	gaze)	helps	to	explain	
historical	trends	in	portraiture.15		
•	Visual	cognition	being	more	sensitive	to	vertical	and	horizontal	lines	partly	explains	the	
orientation	of	strikes	in	writing	systems.4		
•	Folk	biology	helps	to	explain	the	cross-cultural	recurrence	of	some	medical	practices	that	
are	in	fact	inefficient.6		
These	psychological	mechanisms	have	features,	or	signatures,	related	to	their	function	and	
how	they	process	information.	We	think	that	the	bets	taken	by	CAT	have	been	very	
informed	bets:	well-grounded	in	up-to-date	experimental	psychology	and	cognitive	theory.	
If	some	of	them	turn	out	to	be	wrong,	then	so	be	it:	those	analyses	will	be	refuted.	This	
shows	that,	if	CAT	remains	general,	it	still	provides	a	frame	for	case	studies	that	are	highly	
falsifiable	and	informative	(see	also	Section	3	of	Misunderstandings).	They	are	falsifiable	in	
three	ways:	on	the	basis	of	their	psychological	assumptions;	on	their	descriptions	of	the	
cultural	phenomena;	and	the	causal	relation	between	these	two	(the	same	is	true,	mutadis	
mutandis,	of	ecological	factors	of	attraction).		
This	brings	us	to	the	most	constructive	recommended	method	for	gathering	evidence	about	
causal	factors	of	cultural	stability:		
Describe	attractors;	document	attraction		
The	reason	for	doing	this	is	that	attraction	is	the	signature	in	culture	of	the	mechanisms	at	
work	in	cultural	chains.	CAT	further	says	that	recovering	what	these	mechanisms	are	has	
great	explanatory	value,	because	they	are	the	causal	factors	that	shape	cultural	phenomena.	
To	describe	attractors	and	document	attraction,	the	scientist	has	to	choose	the	right	kind	of	
granularity	for	describing	cultural	items	(Box	2	of	Misunderstandings).	The	right	level	of	
granularity	is	not	too	coarse,	otherwise	you	only	describe	memes.	You	fail	to	identify	the	
underlying	causal	processes,	and	you	can	do	little	more	than	observe	items	that	are	
successful	are	being	reproduced—a	tautology.	So	empirical	work	inspired	by	CAT	considers	
not	just	portraits,	but	portraits	with	eye	gaze	direction;	and	not	just	writing	systems,	but	
writing	systems	with	their	ratio	of	vertical	and	horizontal	lines.4,15	In	both	cases,	this	level	
of	description	allows	the	researcher	to	investigate	the	causal	role	that	aspects	of	human	
psychology	play	in	the	evolution	and	stability	of	a	cultural	phenomenon.		
3.	Conclusions	
Thinking	that	CAT	provides	a	general	recipe	for	the	study	of	culture	can,	as	Buskell	points	
out,	generate	misunderstandings	and	frustration.	CAT	is	“only”	a	framework	theory.	Still,	
we	find	it	fair	and	fruitful	to	challenge	CAT,	as	Buskell	does,	on	its	ability	to	generate	
guidance	for	empirical	studies.	CAT	does	need	to	be	fleshed	out	with	methods	that	are	
adapted	to	the	cases	studied.	Also,	the	methods	of	CAT	are	still	in	development.	Cultural	
attraction	theorists	have	had	an	open	(yet	critical)	eye	on	opportunities.	Those	given	by	
modeling,	cultural	transmission	experiments,	and	phylogenetic	analyses	are	all	high	on	the	
agenda.	We	wrote	Misunderstandings	with	the	hope	that	social	scientists	will	join	these	
exciting	developments	without	being	hampered	by	possible	misunderstandings.		
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